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The following observations are drawn from the opening workshop of the ESRC/DFID funded 
project (Ref: ES/M008932/1), ‘Poverty Alleviation in the Wake of Typhoon Yolanda’. The 
workshop was held on 30 September 2015 at Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, 
Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Delegates at the workshop were drawn from academia, 
civil society, the business community and the military2. Around 50 delegates attended the 
workshop. All of the delegates involved in the workshop were experts or had experience in 
disaster relief either in the field or as a topic of academic and policy research. Experts were 
drawn from the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand. In some cases workshop 
delegates were on the ground during Typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) or the 
immediate aftermath. The workshop was composed of three panels entitled: ‘Poverty 
Alleviation in the Wake of Natural Disasters’, ‘Livelihood and Community’ and ‘Governance 
and Resilience’, and a closing round table discussion.  
 
The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate an exchange of ideas and reflections on 
disaster planning. The purpose of this paper is to outline key themes and issues that were 
                                                     
1 This project is funded by the ESRC/DFID Joint Fund for Poverty Alleviation Research. Award reference: 
ES/M008932/1.  
2 For the full workshop program see: ‘Poverty Alleviation in the Wake of Typhoon Yolanda’ under workshop 
materials http://projectyolanda.org/project-yolanda/workshop-materials.aspxh (Accessed 6 January 2016).   
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raised during the workshop. Many of these ideas will inform the direction of our project and 
will be used to test the circumstances under which the post-disaster environment can be ‘built 
back better’. In broad terms the issues raised during the workshop were either material, 
including financial aid and relief goods, or social, including family and community resilience, 
institutional capabilities and politics. However the distribution and control of material 
resources is a social activity that inevitably reveals underlying power structures, political 
objectives and also powerlessness or a lack of capabilities. The following observations are 
not intended as research conclusions but rather as issues for consideration and testing.  
 
This paper starts with a brief outline of typhoon Yolanda and the effect on the Eastern 
Visayas region in order to put our themes in context. The paper then addresses the issue of 
how natural ‘natural’ disasters are. We address the political nature of disasters and the extent 
to which disasters may be capitalised on in order to further political aims and objectives. We 
argue that disasters have to be seen within a social context as relief and rehabilitation have to 
be sensitive to local and national social contexts in order to be effective. This applies to 
politics but also to community and family hierarchies. Hierarchies evolve over a number of 
variables that can include religion, age, class, ethnicity and gender. 
 
Typhoon Yolanda in context 
 
On 8 November 2013 super-typhoon Yolanda hit the Visayas region of the Philippines. 
Yolanda was one of the strongest typhoons ever to make landfall. The damage was 
catastrophic. Official figures indicate that 6,293 individuals were reported dead, 1,061 went 
missing, 28,689 were injured and vast areas of agricultural land were devastated3. The 
typhoon affected 591 municipalities and total damage is estimated at US$904,680,000. The 
total number of people affected by this disaster in terms of livelihood, environmental and 
food security is approximately 16 million people. The Visayas region, home to some of the 
poorest provinces in the Philippines, was left with many more people destitute due to 
Yolanda. The city of Tacloban became the ‘poster town’ for the impact of Yolanda. Tacloban 
sits near the head of the Leyte Gulf. It is a rapidly growing and highly vulnerable urbanized 
                                                     
3 However the death toll for Yolanda is highly contested as a body had to be presented to the authorities is order 
for a death to be recorded. In many cases this was not possible as bodies were either swept away or families 
resorted to burying their own dead in the face of inaction by the authorities. See i.e. Gabieta, Joy (2014) 
‘Yolanda Death Toll Still Vague 8 Months Later’, Philippines Daily Inquirer, 2 July. Available at: 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/616060/yolanda-death-toll-still-vague-8-months-later. Accessed 19 October 2015.   
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area. A major cause of death for Tacloban and other Yolanda hit areas was that Yolanda was 
accompanied by a ‘storm surge’ that was 17 feet high in places4. Local residents failed to 
appreciate the meaning of ‘storm surge’ (as opposed to tsunami) and in some cases failed to 
evacuate despite warnings in advance of Yolanda’s landfall.   
 
The social construction of disaster 
 
Throughout the workshop the delegates repeatedly raised the issue of how natural ‘natural’ 
disasters are. Just as risk and resilience are socially constructed so too are understandings of 
what is natural. 
 
How natural are ‘natural’ disasters?  
 
The impact of ‘natural’ disasters is arguably modified by human behaviour in terms of both 
the scale and severity5 of the environmental phenomenon and the organisation of human 
settlements. Humans are increasingly, by accident or design, living in densely populated, 
highly vulnerable areas. Consequently the material damage and death toll from disasters is 
greater. Not because the environmental magnitude of disasters is necessarily greater but 
because of the increased density of human settlements in environmentally fragile areas. This 
is particularly true of coastal areas. The sea is a source of livelihood for coastal communities 
and water is the cheapest way to move goods.  
The urban poor are extremely vulnerable to natural disasters. Communities are often un-
regulated, over-crowded and there is scant possibility of squatter or slum-housing meeting 
risk compliant building regulations. Urban population growth consistently outpaces rural 
population growth6. Over 40% of the Philippine urban population lives in slums. The city of 
Tacloban, that bore the brunt of typhoon Yolanda, was a rapidly growing and highly 
                                                     
4 See Lagmay, Alfredo M. F. (2014) ‘Devastating Storm Surges of Typhoon Yolanda’. Nationwide Operational 
Assessment of Hazards, 2 June. Available at: http://blog.noah.dost.gov.ph/2014/06/02/devastating-storm-surges-
of-typhoon-yolanda. Accessed 19 October 2015.  
5 Hannam, Peter (2015) ‘ Super typhoons to increase in strength with climate change’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/super-typhoons-to-increase-in-
strength-with-climate-change-researchers-find-20150529-ghcbfs.html. Accessed 19 October 2015  
6 World Health Organisation (2016) ‘Urban Population Growth’, Global Health Observatory Data. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/gho/urban_health/situation_trends/urban_population_growth_text/en/. Accessed 31 January  
2016. 
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vulnerable7 urbanized area. ‘Over 20 years, the city’s population has risen by 62%, from 
136,891 in 1990 to 221,174 in 2010. Population density has increased from 679 / sq km in 
1990 to 1,096 / sq km in 2010’8. Tacloban has a large community living in ‘informal’ 
housing. This community was both most at risk from the typhoon and least able to resurrect 
itself after the disaster. This is why our project has chosen to focus on urban vulnerability to 
disasters. 
Are disasters political? 
 
The politicisation of disasters was raised repeatedly in our workshop. The focus of our 
project is not to investigate the party or personality politics that were evident in the aftermath 
of typhoon Yolanda.  However the partisan, dynastic, family based and often corrupt nature 
of politics in the Philippines meant that political infighting over the Yolanda relief effort was 
inevitable. This state of affairs was exemplified by Interior and Local Government Secretary 
Mar Roxas’ comment to Tacloban Mayor Alfred Romualdez9 to remember that ‘you are a 
Romualdez and the president is an Aquino’10 during a discussion over the organisation of the 
Yolanda relief effort. In other words be mindful that you are from opposing political clans 
when assigning the disaster relief responsibilities of local and national level governments. 
 
In the aftermath of disasters questions of who gets what, when and how much inevitably 
come into play. Disasters can also be politicised for short term aims by different individuals, 
parties and sectors. Some politicians also take advantage of disaster situations and political 
rivalries are exposed. Victims, mostly displaced, understandably want immediate help. 
However political infighting and the desire to capitalise of the situation as a ‘benefactor’ can 
hinder the distribution of relief goods. For instance some politicians and government agency 
personnel were accused of decanting international aid into bags decorated with political 
                                                     
7 Ranada, Pia ‘Tacloban in the jaws of a climate “sandwich”’, Rappler, 16 January 2016. Available at: 
http://www.rappler.com/nation/48129-tacloban-climate-adaptation-study. Accessed 5 January 2016.  
8 ‘Business Risk Assessment and the Management of Climate Change Impacts: 16 Philippine Cities 2014’, 
World Wildlife Fund for Nature and Bank of the Philippine Islands Foundation, 2014, p. 99. Available at: 
http://wwf.org.ph/downloads/pubs/BPI_BRAM_CC.pdf. Accessed 5 January 2016.  
 
9 Alfred Romualdez is the nephew of former First Lady Imelda Marcos; her hometown is Tacloban. The 
Marcoses and Aquinos are historic political adversaries.  
10 Please see here: ‘Yolanda Telling Off Tacloban Mayor Alfred Romualdez’. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_oxV8ylgOI. Accessed 20 October 2015.    
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colours for political gain11. How various levels of government react, or are perceived to be 
reacting, will affect how people view them, i.e. either as saviours or enemies of the victims. 
Aid or assistance, including shelter and resettlement, is also political. Distribution and 
prioritization are political. 
 
We anticipate that the coming 2016 elections will affect the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
efforts as local and national politicians seek to appeal to the voters at local and national 
levels. It is possible that funds will be released in the immediate run up to the election to 
curry favour with voters. It is also possible that political opponents will accuse each other of 




The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), local and national 
government officials, the state weather bureau (PAGASA), the Department of Science and 
Technology's Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards (Project NOAH) and the media 
warned of the need for evacuation, especially in coastal communities, prior to Yolanda. As is 
the norm many men and older boys stayed to guard households whilst women and children 
went to evacuation centres. However many people did not evacuate at all as they were used to 
typhoons and did not expect the intensity of the typhoon or the storm surge that came with it. 
The failure to take evacuation warnings seriously resulted in many deaths. The decision not 
to evacuate was made on the basis that previous typhoons had not been ‘that bad’ and there 
was no previous experience of a storm surge in living memory. We anticipate that the number 
of women-led households and women as primary earners has increased post-Yolanda. 
However we are also aware that men, women and children all perished as evidenced by the 
                                                     
11 Zdanowicz, Christina and Hunt, Katie (2013) ‘Are Philippine Politicians Using Aid to Their Advantage?’ 
CNN.com, 22 November. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/22/world/asia/philippines-politicians-
typhoon-aid-advantage-irpt/. Accessed 20 October 2015.  
12 There is already evidence of this: Fernandez, Anne, ‘Caritas Official: Yolanda funds release could overlap 
with 2016 polls’,  Interaksyon, 6 August 2016. Available at: http://www.interaksyon.com/article/115577/caritas-
official-yolanda-funds-release-could-overlap-with-2016-polls. Accessed 6 January 2016; 
Sy, Marvin, ‘Unspent Yolanda Funds could be used for polls – Bongbong’, The Philippine Star, 5 November 
2015. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/11/05/1518541/unspent-yolanda-funds-could-be-
used-polls-bongbong. Accessed 6 January 2016. 
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list of casualties13 released by the national government. From the list it is clear that many 
children died, as they were unable to protect themselves when the storm surge came.   
 
Various agencies have sought to factor gender into both disaster risk reduction and relief and 
rehabilitation14. During the workshop safety in evacuation centres and relocation sites was 
raised as a key issue. Often evacuation areas are not safe or suitable for women and children. 
Evacuation areas were not purpose built and lacked adequate electricity and sanitation 
facilities. This was the case at the Tacloban Astrodome. The Astrodome saved many lives but 
it was not equipped for its temporary residents to stay for an extended period of time15. 
Subsequently many Yolanda victims were living in tents for up to two years.16 This is a 
situation that clearly poses difficulties in terms of physical safety, emotional well-being and 
dignity. The issue of safe and adequate sanitation facilities and adequate living space is an 
issue that continues to affect internally displaced persons (IDPs) still living in temporary 
housing in Yolanda affected areas17. The failure of the government to adequately address 
these issues was highlighted by Chaloka Beyani, The United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
the human rights of internally displaced persons, who commented that: 
 
Many families remain housed in collective “bunkhouses” that do not meet 
necessary minimum standards for the provision of basic needs and services and 
create numerous safety and protection challenges, particularly for women and 
                                                     
13 Republic of the Philippines Official Gazette (n.d.) Official List of Casualties: Typhoon Yolanda. Available at: 
http://www.gov.ph/crisis-response/updates-typhoon-yolanda/casualties/. Accessed 31 January 2016, 
14Benelli, Prisca, Mazurana, Dyan and Walker, Peter (2012) ‘Using sex and age disaggregated data to improve 
humanitarian response in emergencies’, Gender and Development, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2012. Available at: 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/Benelli%20Mazurana%20Walker%20SA
DD%20Gender%20and%20Development%202012.pdf. Accessed 31 January 2016; Gender Based Violence 
Area of Responsibility Working Group (2010) Handbook for Coordinating Gender Based Violence 
Interventions in Humanitarian Settings, Global Protection Cluster. Available at: http://gbvaor.net/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2012/10/Handbook-for-Coordinating-Gender-based-Violence-in-Humanitarian-Settings-
GBV-AoR-2010-ENGLISH.pdf. Accessed 31 January 2016.  
 
 
15 Gelineau, Kristin (2013) ‘Tacloban Astrodome, at First Typhoon Refuge, Now a Pit of Suffering Without 
Aid’, The Huffington Post, 14 November. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/14/tacloban-
astrodome-refuge_n_4275576.html. Accessed 31 January 2016.   
16 Herrera, Christine F. and Fabunan, Sara S. D. (2015) ‘132, 000 Yolanda Victims Still Live in Tents’, The 
Manila Standard Today, 25 July. Available at: http://manilastandardtoday.com/news/-main-stories/top-
stories/183042/132-000-yolanda-victims-still-live-in-tents.html. Accessed 31 January 2016.  
17 Cahinhinan, John C. (2015) ‘Tacloban Bunkhouse Residents complain about poor sanitation’, Sun Star 
Manila, 8 November. Available at: http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/2015/11/08/tacloban-
bunkhouse-residents-complain-about-poor-sanitation-440335?qt-sidebar_tabs=0. Accessed 31 January 2016. 
 7 
girls who face threats including sexual abuse and early pregnancy, as well as 
failing to provide conditions of privacy and dignity18.  
 
Women and children are also vulnerable to trafficking in the frequently chaotic aftermath of a 
disaster. They may remain vulnerable in the longer term because of extreme poverty19. This 
situation may be exacerbated if ID and other personal documentation are lost during the 
disaster. Cases of prostitution and violence increased after Yolanda20. Leyte and Samar had 
already been identified as ‘trafficking hotspots’21 and Yolanda simply served to exacerbate 
vulnerability.  
 
Other Affected Groups 
 
In the course of our workshop discussions it became evident that gender (female) was often 
highlighted as a specific area of vulnerability; however other groups such as children, the 
elderly or youth faced their own specific set of problems. For out-of-school youth 
opportunities such as educational access could be curtailed and the elderly or less able might 
face significant problems in terms of their well being in the face of physical vulnerability or 
loss of family members. The loss of family members, especially if they were the main earner 
in a family, impacts on all family members, especially the most vulnerable. More broadly this 
can have an impact on the well-being of entire communities. This can be exacerbated when 
communities are fractured or relocated; hence the need for psycho-social care and community 
rebuilding. Younger children typically lost three months of schooling after Yolanda and 
many have had to change schools due to temporary relocation and are likely to have to do so 
again when permanent relocation sites are completed. This is to say nothing of the actual 
trauma of going through the typhoon. For some children this has left a lasting legacy as they 
                                                     
18 Beyani, Chaloka (2015) ‘Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of 
internally displaced persons, Chaloka Beyani, on the conclusion of his official visit to the Philippines, 21 to 31 
July 2015’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner. Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16280&LangID=E. 31 January 
2016.  
19 ‘“Yolanda” sparks Philippine child trafficking fears – charity’ (20.14), Philippines Daily Inquirer, 12 January. 
Available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/562465/yolanda-sparks-philippine-child-trafficking-fears-charity. 
Accessed 20 October 2015.  Ramos, Roy (2014) ‘Report: Filipino Victims Forced Into the Sex Trade’, Adadolu 
Agency. Available at: http://www.aa.com.tr/en/life/report-filipino-typhoon-victims-forced-into-sex-
trade/105156. Adadolu Agency, Accessed 20 October 2015.    
20 ‘Worsening Prostitution and Violence Against Women’ (2014) Ang Bayan. 
http://www.philippinerevolution.net/publications/ang_bayan/20140307/worsening-prostitution-and-violence-
against-women. Accessed 20 October 2015. 
21 Swanson, David (2013) ‘Typhoon Haiyan heightens protection concerns’, IRIN Humanitarian News and 
Analysis. Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/report/99339/typhoon-haiyan-heightens-protection-concerns. 
Accessed 31 January 2016. 
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have lost parents or other family members. Many agencies also report that children are 
anxious about another typhoon and are fearful of the wind22.   
 
Disasters also reveal the following: 
 
x Underlying patterns of discrimination (including political); 
x Vulnerability which is socially constructed; 
x Risk and ‘risky’ behaviour (how and why decisions are made in relation to risk at 
multiple levels including the individual and the community); 
x Capacity or lack of capacity (resilience); and 
x Corruption (is corruption resilient under conditions of disaster?) 
 
National and Local Governance in Disaster Risk and Reduction Management: 
Accountability, Coordination and Governance 
 
Under this heading a number of questions were raised:  
 
x It was proposed that R.A. 1012123 increases the capacity of local government units 
(LGUs). This is an issue that will be examined against the legislation and in practice 
over the course of our research.  
x Who are the stakeholders at different stages of recovery and rehabilitation? The 
answer to the question might involve a stakeholder mapping exercise.  
x To what extent have LGUs complied with national mandates? Should they even do 
this? Where does the power lie? How can we measure this? Why are LGUs waiting 
for guidelines from the national government? 
x Who steers the rehabilitation process in each LGU?  Why the differences in 
approach? Why are there different success rates? How can this be measured?  
                                                     
22 Finnegan, Leah (2013) After Yolanda: What Children Think, Need and Recommend, Save the Children: 
Manila. Available at: 
https://www.savethechildren.net/sites/default/files/After%20Yolanda%20What%20Children%20Think%20Nee
d%20and%20Recommend%20Joint%20Agency%20Report.pdf. Accessed 31 January 2016.  
23 See: Republic Act. No 10121. (2010) National Disaster Coordination Council. Available at: 
http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/95/Implementing_Rules_and_Regulartion_RA_10121.pdf 
Accessed 20 October 2015.  
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x As the immediate aftermath of Yolanda revealed, most LGUs had no or limited 
recovery and rehabilitation plans or have unrealistic Disaster Risk Reduction and 




In the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) and UP College of Social Work and 
Community Development project that produced the book Shifting Paradigms24, the 
researchers found that: 
x DRRM councils in the areas studied (four sites in Guiuan, Eastern Samar; Palo in 
Leyte and San Francisco in Cebu) were not set up except in the island of San 
Francisco, which had zero casualties and damages were relatively low due to 
established mangroves. 
x Land use plans were not observed with house developers given certificates to 
build even in danger zones. 
x There was no contingency planning. 
x Damage Analysis and Needs Assessment (DANA) exists only in San Francisco. 
x Interventions from government and non-government/international agencies such 
as the donation of fishing boats, rice seedlings that are not resilient to the weather 
conditions, loans for small livelihood, cash/food for work, etc., were not backed 
up by solid planning and assessment. If unregulated these strategies could turn out 
to be detrimental to communities and the local environment.  
x There is no “build back better” and vulnerabilities have not been addressed.   
x Resettlement areas are still in danger zones. 
 
These issues and the accompanying data can be cross-checked in our project, specifically in 
Palo as we have also chosen to examine that LGU. In the workshop discussions the following 
problems were also identified:  
 
                                                     
24 Bagawan, A. B. et Al. (2015) Shifting Paradigms: Strengthening Institutions for Community-Based Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Management, College of Social Work and Community Development, University of the 
Philippines. Available at: http://cswcd.upd.edu.ph/?p=4680. Accessed 20 October 2015. Some of the authors of 
this project were at the workshop and were able to discuss their findings with us. 
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x In the issue of shelter, it is very difficult to make authorities accountable. People feel 
powerless as they cannot even use local media for help since political families also 
influence or control local media.  
x Coordination was a key problem in the Yolanda areas. Most protocols were done 
haphazardly and no simulation testing was done at any level of government25. This is 
not a problem unique to Yolanda. In Cambodia, early warning systems exist but flows 
of information are not working well. In the case of Hurricane Katrina the simulation 
‘Hurricane Pam’ was run in 200426. In 2005 Hurricane Katrina revealed the 
limitations of disaster planning even when the effects are reasonably accurately 
predicted.  
Clearly it seems to be the case that disaster, risk and reduction planning is reactive rather than 
proactive. The Philippines lies within the Ring of Fire and is also on the Pacific Typhoon 




LGU officials and local emergency service personnel were also victims of Yolanda, so it is 
also understandable that there should be protocols for higher levels of government to have an 
active role in situations where LGUs will not immediately be able to act. This was the case in 
Typhoon Yolanda as many government security service personnel and their families were 
victims of the typhoon themselves. However since the typhoon various parties have accused 
each other of being unprepared, although there is a consensus that no one could have 
predicted a ‘storm surge’ that was tsunami like in strength and effect. 
 
There were also logistical problems in the region as debris made many of the roads 
impassable. This led to differing opinions over the following: 
 
x National and local government responsibilities;  
x The role of the military (especially foreign military personnel)28; 
                                                     
25 However geo-hazard maps were released by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the Department of the 
Environment and Natural Resources (MGB-DENR) in 2012 
26 Beriwal, Efren (2006) ‘Preparing for A Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise’ Statement Before the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Available at: 
www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/012406beriwal.  Accessed 20 October 2015.  
27 OCHA Regional Office for Asia Pacific (2011) Natural Hazard Risks. Available at:   
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/4179_ochaphlhazardv3110606.pdf. Accessed 31 January 2016.  
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x The merits and appropriateness of cash for work programmes: Was it a good idea to 
give people cash with little or no checks on actual needs of recipients? Was it 
appropriate for people to be paid to clear their own backyards? Did this contribute 
towards aid dependency? 
x What is the actual death count for typhoon Yolanda? This is highly disputed as 
people resorted to burying their own dead and many bodies are still missing. In 
which case the death was not recorded, as a body could not be produced to the 
authorities.  
 
Governance: The Medium Term Response 
 
The Philippine government, LGUs and local communities and individuals received a high 
volume of international aid. However there are still problems with relief and rehabilitation 
including housing and livelihood. This leads to a number of questions: 
 
x Has aid been under-utilized? If so, why?  
x Is it because government has low absorptive capacity? If so why is this? (e.g. 
problems with procurement and bureaucratic procedures)  
x Where should accountability lie? At the local or national level?  
x How effectively did international donors coordinate with the Philippine government 
at the local and national level?  
x How effectively did the emergency response phase convert into the rebuilding phase?   
 
The government is still very important, especially in addressing climate change issues, but 
should ideally be supported by other sectors and non-state actors. There should also be 
champions at the local government level. Officials and leaders at all levels must be 
accountable to a rigorous process of checks and balances to ensure sound planning, 
transparency and fiscal accountability. However there is a history in the Philippines of 
government employees, up to and including the president, being incarcerated on charges of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
28 Bayan Media Release, ‘US Pacific Partnership 2014 exploits ‘Yolanda’ missions for war exercises in Eastern 
Visayas’, 3 July 2014. Available at: https://bayansiniranganbisayas.wordpress.com/2014/07/03/us-pacific-
partnership-2014-exploits-yolanda-missions-for-war-exercises-in-eastern-visayas-bayan-ev/. Accessed 6 
January 2016; ‘US Military a “godsend” to Yolanda victims’, The Philippine Inquirer, 17 November 2013. 
Available at: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/91407/us-military-godsend-to-yolanda-victims. Accessed 6 January 
2016.  
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fiscal mismanagement and corruption. This has led to officials being over cautious in 
financial management and rehabilitation projects stalling due to the slow release of funds. A 
balance needs to be struck between accountability and efficiency. Sometimes, capacities and 
perspectives of national government agencies also need to change. For instance, the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) appears to be unwilling to share its 
database with aid agencies. However, this may also be because the agency itself lacks the 
necessary database29.  
 
Nevertheless several national agencies are assuming responsibility for international agency 
pilot projects on resilience and climate change adaptation in Yolanda areas and are now 
applying them region-wide, e.g. seasonal crop rotation, introducing higher level processing of 
crops produced. 13,639,552,418 PHP30 (£200,558,000) worth of crops were lost to Yolanda, 
the vast majority of which was down to the loss of coconut produce. Six million coconut trees 
were lost. It takes between six to ten years to re-establish coconut as a crop once it is 
destroyed. Meanwhile the DSWD is continuing to identify sustainable livelihood 
opportunities under the Accelerated and Sustainable Anti–Poverty Program (ASAPP) of the 
Human Development and Poverty Reduction (HDPR) Cluster. It is also working towards a 
‘community driven approach to livelihood rehabilitation’31 
 
It was suggested during the workshop that there is a need for systemic change in disaster 
management. Some suggestions for improved Disaster Risk Reduction Management 
(DRRM) are as follows: 
x Adequate preparation and planning;  
                                                     
29 See: National Anti-Poverty Commission Barangay Bayan Database, NHTS Data. Available at: 
http://maps.napc.gov.ph/downloads/index.php/2-uncategorised/2-nhts-data.  Accessed 6 January 2016.  
However note that Eastern Visayas only includes statistics for Samar, not Leyte. For methodology see: 
Fernandez, Luisa, ‘Design and Implementation Features of the National Housing Targeting System in the 
Philippines’, Philippine Social Protection Note, The World Bank Group, AusAid, 2012. Available at: 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/06/20/000356161_20120620023159/Rendered/
PDF/701490BRI0P1180l0Protection0Note005.pdf. Accessed 6 January 2016.  
30 Mayans, Julie (2014) ‘Food Security and Livelihood Rapid Assessment in inland Municipalities of Leyte’, 
Solidarities International, p. 7. Available at: 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/1401_SI_FSL%20Assessment%20Report_
rural%20Leyte.pdf. Accessed 1 February 2016,  
31 International LabourOrganisation (2015) ‘DSWD, ILO Partnership for Sustainable Livelihood’, Press 
Release. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/manila/public/newsitems/WCMS_349658/lang--en/index.htm. 1 
February 2016.  
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x Integrated and comprehensive approaches with governments and communities 
working together, with the help of community based organisations (CBOs), 
international aid agencies, the private sector, experts and scholars;   
x Setting up an accountability unit to monitor DRRM with local champions; 
x Reorienting farming to produce for health and food security instead of immediate 
production and income; 
x Making resettlement areas  resilient, located in safe areas, and with sufficient and 
sustainable livelihood opportunities and basic services, with communities resettled 
as a unit wherever possible so as not to disrupt social capital any more than is 
necessary; and  
x Building Back Better taking heed of previous experience With efforts based on 
lessons from the past so that previous mistakes are not repeated: What were the 
mistakes made in previous cases? Have these been repeated? Are there best 
practices? 
 
Coordination with Civil Society and Other Non-government Groups 
 
If government does not or is unable to act quickly and effectively for relief and rehabilitation, 
then civil society and international relief agencies can step in. This is imperative in the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster but it raises a number of issues in the longer term including 
the ownership of policy and accountability. Workshop panelists argued that critics should not 
only just criticize  the government as this is a purely negative strategy. Instead they should be 
prepared to identify strategies and to implement them. Despite differences, they must be able 
to ‘enter government sideways’ and work on common issues, with civil society organisations 
(CSOs) pressuring the government to act and working with government agencies in specific 
areas. Non-government agencies can provide specific expertise and innovation. They are also 
less hamstrung by red tape and political infighting (although this still exists within NGOs) 
and should aim to work in tandem with the government in order to consolidate scaled up and 
resilient policy. Civil society is not yet doing much in the area of development and 
rehabilitation but it should be engaged more. We found that a particular issue was reporting 
and cross-referencing between NGOs/INGOs and the government. Therefore:  
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x Relief and rehabilitation need to be integrated and coordinated within cases. To what 
extent have agencies communicated information effectively? 
x If there have been lapses what is the cost in terms of relief and rehabilitation? 
 
Private companies were active in the emergency relief32 stage of the disaster and continue to 
donate funds until now33. The business sector in Eastern Visayas aims to increase household 
income as a means to alleviate poverty. The business community is now working with 
different levels of government to promote inclusive growth, although there are differences in 
priorities. However, the business sector wants resettlement sites that are resilient and 
equipped with basic facilities while national government’s priority is building a sea wall. 
Before Yolanda, the private sector in the area was weak and left DRRM and poverty 
alleviation to the government. After Yolanda, the private sector stepped in and was 
instrumental in having no casualties during Typhoon Ruby in 2014.  
 
A number of issues were also raised in relation to the donors’ distribution of aid. These are as 
follows:  
 
x Funding mostly focused on short-term relief but not suitable for the conditions of 
the area, e.g. boats (too many), seeds (wrong kind), etc. 
x Some donors were tasked with rapidly spending the money allocated and 
distributing goods quickly. The priority seemed to be reporting on the job done 
and the number of beneficiaries ‘helped’ rather than a practical and forward 
thinking distribution of resources. (We have since found that this is a major issue 
with fishing boats. This phenomenon was seen previously after the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami and now repeated here.)  
x Aid allocation should respect local communities and local knowledge.  
                                                     
32 Rappler (2013) ‘Companies Help Yolanda Survivors’, Rappler.com. Available at: 
http://www.rappler.com/business/43537-companies-help-yolanda-survivors. Accessed 31 January 2016. 
33 Ayala Foundation (2013) ‘Ayala Foundation and Partners Provide Sustainable Livelihood Assistance in 
Leyte’, http://www.ayalafoundation.org/ayala-foundation-and-partners-provide-sustainable-livelihood-
assistance-in-leyte/. Accessed 1 February 2016.  
Punay, Edu (2014) ‘More Firms Join Housing Project for Yolanda Survivors’, The Philippine Star, 6 October. 
Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/10/06/1376920/more-firms-join-housing-project-yolanda-
survivors. Accessed 31 January 2016.  
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation (2015) ‘Typhoon Haiyan Corporate Aid Tracker’. Available at: 
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/corporate-citizenship-center/typhoon-haiyan-corporate-aid-tracker. 
Accessed 31 January 2016.   
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x There may be ‘turfing issues between donors’; some communities and 
beneficiaries have asked if they are being used or exploited. A stage may also be 
reached where victims become fed up with aid initiatives if nothing much seems 
to change in terms of the conditions of their existence. If locals are not involved in 
decision making then they may also become aid dependent.    
x Aid agencies should focus on helping government planning instead of simply 
giving aid to communities; goal should be to empower communities in the long-
run through sustainable poverty alleviation. 
x Climate change adaptation finance or aid from abroad is currently spent half on 
reconstruction and half on rehabilitation. It is not spent on adaptation which 
should actually be the focus of aid. Why is this the case? 
 
Shelter and Relocation 
 
In all of the LGUs that this project examines, residents are being moved away from the 
coastal ‘danger zones’ (or no-build zones) and inland to higher ground. However this raises a 
number of issues including the merits of moving people at all. There is a clear tension 
between relocation and livelihood. Residents, especially fishermen, rely on the sea for their 
livelihood. The problem is particularly acute in Tacloban where the northern resettlement 
barangays are perhaps 20 kilometres from the sea. Whilst it is possible to travel back to the 
sea the cost of transport, the security of boats, access to markets and a lack of refrigeration 
are clearly issues. The tension between safe housing and secure livelihood will be an ongoing 
problem for the relief effort. Water security is also a major concerns for the resettled 
communities as some places are still without permanent piped water supplies and relied on 
trucked water for their daily water needs.  
 
No Build Zones 
 
Pre-Yolanda ‘no build zone debates’ were evident in Manila, for example in the areas around 
the Pasig and Marikina Rivers34 (especially after Typhoon Ondoy). The ‘no build zone 
                                                     
34 Verzola, Jun with Barrientos, Brenda, Waterway Settlers Brace for Both Ramil and Demolition’ GMA News 
Research, 20 October 2009. Available at: 
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/175067/news/nation/waterway-settlers-brace-for-both-ramil-and-
demolition. Accessed 7 January 2016; ‘Flood Disaster Mitigation and River Rehabilitation by Marikina City, 
Philippines’, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Program for Hydro-meteorological Disaster Mitigation in 
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policy’ is a hotly contested topic35 and is currently being reviewed for its legality by the 
Department of Justice under Justice Secretary Leila de Lima36. Meanwhile the Philippine 
House of Representatives passed Resolution No. 947 in March 2014, which called for an 
inquiry into the ‘No-build Zone, No-dwell Zone policy37’. This debate is likely to be 
heightened if the proposed tidal embankment project38, running from the San Juanico Bridge 
to the municipality of Tolosa, goes ahead.  
 
The embankment is controversial in Tacloban as thousands of people still live in the ‘no 
dwell zone’. If the embankment went ahead before residents were adequately relocated they 
would be left with nowhere to go. There is also a debate over the cost of the embankment as 
the provision of adequately equipped permanent alternative housing in the northern 
barangays has proven to be a painfully slow process. Critics say that the money would be 
better spent on housing and the provision of adequate utilities and services in new 
communities in safe zones. At the moment even the permanent housing that is completed in 
Tacloban is under occupied due to inadequate utilities, especially water which has to be 
shipped in by tanker.  
 
However there are examples elsewhere of good practice, e.g. in Bicol. Due to public 
education and community involvement in geo-mapping and land use planning exercises, 
people are moving away from hazardous areas39. For this project we are interested to 
compare best practices across Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan and what drives these either 
materially, socially, geographically and in terms of good governance and strategy.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Secondary Cities in Asia, 2008. Available at: http://www.un-spider.org/sites/default/files/4-
Flood_Mitigation_Philipines_ADPC.pdf. Accessed 7 January 2016.  
35 Basilio, Boojie, ‘Everything you wanted to know about Tacloban’s “No Build Zone” But Were Afraid to 
Ask’, Re-Charge Tacloban, 2014. Available at: http://re-charge.ph/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-
taclobans-no-build-zone-but-are-afraid-to-ask/.  Accessed 7 January 2016.  
36 InterAksyon.com, ‘DoJ conducting legal study on No-Build Zone Policy, critics say’, Pamalakaya-Pilipinas: 
National Federation of Small Fisherfolks Organizations in the Philippines, 5 April 2014. Available at: 
https://pamalakayaweb.wordpress.com/2014/04/05/doj-conducting-legal-study-on-no-build-zone-policy-critics-
say/#more-927. Accessed 7 January 2016.  
37 House Resolution No.  947, Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives, Quezon City, 11 March 
2014. Available at: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/basic_16/HR00947.pdf. Accessed 7 January 2016.  
38 ‘“Great Wall of Tacloban” Protects Coastline Municipalities from Storm Surges’, Northbound Philippines 
News Online, 9 November 2015. Available at: http://northboundasia.com/2015/11/09/great-wall-of-tacloban-
protects-coastline-municipalities-from-storm-surges/. Accessed 6 November 2016.  
39 Espinas, Agnes, ‘Geography and Public Planning: Albay and Disaster Risk Management’, Human 
Development Network, PHDR Issue 2012/13, No. 4. Available at: http://hdn.org.ph/wp-
content/uploads/DP_04_Espinas.pdf. Accessed 7 January 2016.   
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The implementation of the Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) programme of the 
government has also suffered from a number of problems. Under this scheme designated 
beneficiaries are allocated 30,000PHP for a totally destroyed house and 10,000PHP for a 
partially destroyed house40. Problems have occurred when people have failed to be 
recognised as beneficiaries. The money is only intended for people (with some caveats41) 
who have no permanent source of income and whose houses were located in ‘safe or 
controlled’ areas which means that families in the ‘no-dwell zone’ do not qualify for the 
money. Those living in the ‘no-dwell zone’ are technically assisted by the Housing and 
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC); however, progress has been painfully 
slow. If those in the ‘no-dwell’ zone have not been rehoused or do not have the means to 
relocate using their own resources, which is the situation in the majority of cases, then 
residents were forced to rebuild using their own meagre resources or whatever non-
governmental help they can access. This has resulted in the construction of multiple 
precarious dwellings in the ‘no-dwell’ zone as people simply have nowhere else to go. 
Notwithstanding the problems of allocation there are questions over what will happen to the 
dwellings that people leave behind. Will these be demolished? If so who will be responsible 
for this and if not is there the danger that they will be taken over by others moving into the 
area or the original residents if they choose to return. Some agencies, such as ‘All Hands’, 
have ignored the guidelines and have helped people rebuild in the ‘no dwell zone’. There 




In Tacloban, government funded bunkhouses are managed by the City Government and 
transitional shelters are managed by a combination of the City Government, the DSWD, the 
Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR), USAID and 
other non-governmental national and international agencies (e.g. Oxfam, Tzu Chi and GMA 
Kapuso).  As of 28 October 2015 there were 954 completed transitional shelters, 613 of 
which were occupied and 344 of which were vacant. The situation in these houses and 
shelters can be difficult. Electricity, water supply and toilet facilities are inadequate or absent. 
                                                     
40 ‘Guidelines for Emergency Shelter Assistance’, City Government of Tacloban, 1 December 2014. Available 
at: http://tacloban.gov.ph/guidelines-for-the-emergency-shelter-assistance/. Accessed 6 January 2016. 
41 ‘P14.8 shelter aid released for “Yolanda survivors” in W. Visayas’, Reliefweb, 18 February 2015. Available 
at: http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/p14-b-shelter-aid-released-yolanda-survivors-w-visayas. Accessed 7 
January 2015.  
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There is also a difference in size and aesthetics between the bunkhouses and other transitional 
shelters. The bunkhouses do not meet international standards42. The Philippine government 
have explained this away as not applying to temporary residents, however it has now been 
two years since the typhoon and many residents are still stuck in temporary housing. Many 
communities hence are  considering the possibilities of these temporary housing as their 




Land rights have been a problem for the rebuilding of permanent shelters, as there is not 
enough suitable land available for rebuilding. Often land is either under private ownership, 
too expensive or too hilly. Land also needs to be acquired in lots big enough to allow for 
economies of scale in rebuilding homes the necessary utilities and services. It is easiest to 
assist rebuilding in safe areas with documented land rights and hardest to help families in the 
no dwell zone without land rights.  13,062 permanent housing units are planned in Tacloban, 
297 have been completed but only 7743 were occupied as of October 2015. The under 
occupation can be explained by a lack of utilities. The allocation of permanent shelters is also 
an issue. During the workshop the following issues were raised:  
 
x The victims’ views were not taken into consideration during the decision-making 
process regarding shelters and they were not aware of the selection criteria for 
beneficiaries. 
x The shortage of electricity in temporary shelters.  
x Some resettlement areas are in danger zones. 
x In Palo, NGOs/humanitarian agencies supplied their own settlement criteria in terms 
of selecting beneficiaries.  
x Building permits may have been waived. 
                                                     
42 Bacini, Louis, ‘Palace on Bunkhouse Mess: We don’t need to follow international standards’, 8 January 2014, 
The Philippine Star. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/01/08/1276499/palace-bunkhouse-
mess-we-dont-need-follow-intl-standards. Accessed 7 January 2014.  
43 Figures supplied by Tacloban City Housing and Community Development Office, 28 October 2015.  
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x UN Rapporteur Chaloka Beyani reports that the Philippine government has not done 
enough. He states that the Philippine government’s response to IDPs is ‘inadequate to 
date’44. 
x There have been land acquisition problems. Safety permits are an issue as is agreed 
approval of sites by local government and central government. The Philippine 
governance system complicates the processes. There is little available suitable land 
and land needs to be acquired in lots of at least a hectare to make building schemes 
viable. 
x Contractors are given the same unit price per unit no matter how remote the housing 
is. This means that far flung housing is likely to be less attractive to developers.  
 
 
Poverty and Livelihood 
 
The Eastern Visayas (Region XIII) was one of the poorest regions in the Philippines before 
Yolanda. It had a poverty incidence among families of 37.4% in 2012, a score that was only 
lower than the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with a score of 
48.7%45.It was also one of only three regions in the Philippines, the other two being the 
ARMM and Socksargen (Central Mindanao), which suffered from an increased rate of 
poverty between 2006 and 2012. In the first half of 2014 Region XIII registered 54.946% 
poverty incidence, slipping second poorest to poorest region in the Philippines post Yolanda. 
 
The industry in the Eastern Visayas is dominated by agriculture and fisheries. However, these 
industries have been on the decline for a number of years. Various reasons have been given 
                                                     
44 Beyani, Chaloka, op. cit.  
45 2012 Full Year Official Poverty Statistics, National Statistical Coordination Board, 9 December 2013, p. ix.  
Available at: 
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/data/fullterm2012/Report%20on%20the%202012%20Full%20Year%20Povert
y%20Statistics.pdf. Accessed 8 January 2016. Samar and Leyte are both in Region VIII. Samar consistently 
scores worse for poverty levels then Leyte when these figures are further disaggregated. 
46 National Statistical Coordination Board, ‘E. Visayas dislodges ARMM as poorest region’, 8 March 2015. 
Available at: http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru8/NewsClip/2015/20150309_bw_poor.pdf. Accessed 7 January 2015.  
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for this including the 2008 financial crisis and the weather47.  In 2013 agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries recorded a negative growth of 6.6%48. 
 
Development strategies in post-disaster situations should be sustainable, inclusive and taking 
into account local knowledge and practices. Livelihood should be addressed beyond the level 
of immediate need or bare subsistence and involve cooperatives and the scaling up of 
production. A balance needs to be found that can foster local economies of scale and 
comparative advantage whilst avoiding ‘disaster capitalism’49. Livelihood training should 
involve business training as well as practical skills. However it also needs to be recognised 
that not all people are natural entrepreneurs, so some flexibility would be needed in allocating 
equipment and responsibilities. Checks and balances need to be put into place to ensure that 
the people who are offered equipment and training do actually intend to use it. This may need 
to go beyond just asking the recipient as cultural norms may dictate that a negative response 
to the offer of aid is seen as either rude or may inhibit offers of future aid. 
 
The issue of experts within communities was also raised. Do locals actually need outside help 
from international ‘experts’ to create livelihood strategies or are they better left to organise 
this themselves? At what point should they be expected to be self-sustaining? 
 
Issues in relation to this might include: 
 
x Capitalising on existing, and providing a platform for new, skills and knowledge; 
x Transfer of knowledge between the local and the international which should be a two-
way process;  
x Donor agenda: To what extent is local need compatible with the focus and 
administrative capabilities and timescales of donors?; and 
x Retaining working strategies and patterns of cooperation and support already within 
communities. 
                                                     
47 Lorenciana, Carol S. ‘East Visayas agri industry plunging since 2009 – NEDA’, The Philippines Star, 6 
October 2015. Available at: http://www.philstar.com:8080/cebu-business/2015/10/06/1507749/eastern-visayas-
agri-industry-plunging-2009-neda. Accessed 7 January 2015.  
48 ‘Statement of NEDA VIII on the 2013 Performance of Eastern Visayas Regional Economy’, 
2013.http://nro8.neda.gov.ph/statement-of-neda-viii-on-the-2013-performance-of-eastern-visayas-regional-
economy/. Accessed 7 January 2015.  
49 Klein, Naomi (2008) The Shock Doctrine, London: Penguin; Klein, Naomi, (2015) This Changes Everything: 
Capitalism vs. the Climate, New York: Simon and Schuster. 
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Trust and Social Capital 
 
Social capital can be defined as a ‘set of norms, networks, and organisations through which 
people gain access to power and resources, and through which decision making and policy 
formulation occur’50. Social capital can be positive and foster community security but it can 
also be negative in relation to nepotism and corruption. It is also culturally situated51. 
Therefore the idea of community and social capital plays out differently in different disaster 
situations. In areas where disasters impact upon communities that already have high levels of 
resource scarcity and/or ethnic tension, violence and corruption relief and rehabilitation work 
is rendered doubly difficult because of this underlying instability. Solidarity and trust in the 
communities may be fragile or absent and impede on the ability of communities to scale up 
self-help. In these cases rehabilitation work may well involve working with civil society to 
help rebuild trust and community resilience. Social vulnerability relates for example to 
attitudes towards risk, capability building and the strength or weakness of coping 
mechanisms including ‘emergency reserves operating at individual, family and community 
levels’52 
 
However in Leyte (unlike other areas of the Philippines such as Muslim Mindanao), there are 
no warring factions (notwithstanding the difficulties between the local and national 
government) or insurgent movements. This means that rehabilitation strategies in Leyte 
should be able to avoid attrition from social fragility or violent attack. However this also 
means that effective rehabilitation may be context specific and lessons learned from good 
practice in one case may not necessarily transfer easily to another.    
 
Some points to further reflect upon include the following: 
                                                     
50 Grootaert, (1998) ‘Social Capital: the missing link’ The World Bank, Social Development Family, 
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, Social Capital Initiative.  Working Paper No. 
3. Washington, p. 2. 
51 Kruger, Fred et al. (2015) Culture and Disasters: Understanding Cultural Framings in Disaster Risk 
Reduction, Abingdon: Routledge.  
52 Davis, Ian (2004) ‘Progress in Analysis of Social Vulnerability and Capacity’, pp. 128-144, in Bankoff, Greg 
et al., Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and People, London: Earthscan, p. 130    
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x Some communities have high social capital and are used to working with each other 
during periods of crisis (i.e. during recurring typhoons)53. 
x In the Philippines, some communities have very high social capital and members want 
to stay together even when they get relocated. This is important to account for when 
devising livelihood and poverty alleviation strategies. If relocation is done in a 
haphazard fashion then individuals may ‘experience a net loss by relocation. External 
forces or conditions that pressure people into doing something that they do not want 
to do contribute to stress and vulnerability’54. 
x Elsewhere in the case of communities in Burma/Myanmar, while the government has 
the coordination function, communities rely on members in helping each other during 
calamities and do not expect/rely on help from outside.  
x How do existing social networks work and how can they be tapped for disaster 
response and rehabilitation?  
x Embedded social wisdom should not be ignored. There had been previous storm 
surges in Tacloban55. It was noted that inter-generation wisdom had been passed 
down as regards the areas of the city that were safe to build on and evacuate during 
typhoons. This process of learning from previous experiences should be revived in 
addressing future problems. The success of this was evident during Typhoon Ruby in 
2014 when no casualties were recorded.  
x Locals should be involved in planning and implementation, especially in shelter plans. 
x In communities, the first instinct is generally not to harm others. Looting was reported 
post-Yolanda but was this ‘looting’ or a search for basic needs such as food and 
water? If there were looters, were these people local or from outside of the area? Has 
this been sensationalised by media? 
x To what extent did people migrate towards the areas where disaster relief was a clear 
focus (Tacloban) and how did non-locals affect or distort relief efforts?  
                                                     
53 See: Bhatt, Mihir R. and Reynolds, Tommy (2012) ‘Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction Realizing the 
Primacy of Community’ in, Haque, C. Emdad and Etkin, David, Disaster Risk and Vulnerability: Mitigation 
through Mobilising Communities and Partnerships, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.  
54 Delica-Willison, Zenaida and Willison, Robin (2004) ‘Vulnerability Reduction: A Task for the Vulnerable 
People Themselves’, pp. 143-173, in Bankoff, Greg et al., Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and 
People, London: Earthscan, p. 153. 
55 Luces, Kim (2013) ‘A History of Storms: 1890s newspaper reveals devastating Leyte typhoon’, GMA news 
online. Available at: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/335673/scitech/science/a-history-of-storms-
1890s-newspaper-reveals-devastating-leyte-typhoon. Accessed 8 February 2016.  
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x To what extent do disasters escalate urbanisation amongst young people? In 
Cambodia as well as in the Philippines and other parts of Asia, young people are 
leaving rural areas to go to urban areas. Rebuilding in rural areas, including 
addressing community, development and poverty issues, after disasters should take 
this fact into consideration. 
 
Resilience and Risk 
 
Resilience can be defined as ‘the capacity of any entity – an individual, a community, an 
organisation, of a natural system – to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and 
stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience’56.  Genuine resilience should be 
rights-based, with the goal of improving adaptive capacities and addressing and reducing 
vulnerabilities and risks. Resilience should also operate on a positive trajectory. The 
experience of disaster should also lead to future effectiveness in mitigation, response and 
adaptation. Lessons should be learned within and between cases.   
 
People and communities may well have their own versions of resilience. This involves the 
combination of indigenous knowledge as well as appropriate science and technology that is 
explained in understandable language instead of scientific jargons. However there is a danger 
that the use of the term resilience can be used by governments or relief agencies to dismiss 
the real needs of communities. Indeed communities may define themselves as resilient, and 
be proud of that, when really they are struggling to cope. Calculations of resilience and 
vulnerability and need to be social as well as physical otherwise relief strategies may not be 
sustainable. The following points should be considered:  
 
x What and who is resilience for?  
x How can we measure this?  
x What fosters and undermines resilience?  
x How/why is resilience distorted and how can we understand this in a social and 
political sense?  
x In times of calamity, resilience should be viewed from the perspective of 
communities. Communities should be self-sustaining and collectivity should be 
                                                     
56 Rodin, Judith (2015) The Resilience Dividend, London: Profile Books, p. 3.  
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fostered. To what extent should resilience be about self-help and does this change 
over time? 
x There are dangers in resilience being driven by donors. Strategies may be 
inequitable, based on neo-liberalism ideology (see point above about disaster 
capitalism), focusing on humanitarian intervention and failing to embed in local 
communities. 
x Are there tradeoffs in development paths; i.e. do neo-liberal strategies undermine 
community-based resilience? To what extent can these be aligned so that they are 
mutually supporting? 
x What was the coverage of psychosocial care in the aftermath of Yolanda? Who was 
able to access this resource? Who were the providers? What was the impact? 
x To what extent has resilience been built through the arts?  
x How has healing and remembering been articulated and expressed by 
communities57?  
x “Building back better” as a concept may not be good for resilience of communities 
in the long-run. For example, in the aftermath of the tsunami in Thailand, this can 
mean ‘business as usual’ or ‘business instead’ of local patterns of livelihood58. This 
in turn can affect the resilience of communities.  
x To what extent is corruption resilient? How successfully do corrupt strategies 
reconfigure themselves to disaster situations?  
x Who and what is the monitoring of risk and resilience for? Does the answer to this 




In terms of moving forward based on the sharing of experiences and insights during the 
workshop, a number of recommendations came out. These are as follows: 
1. Various groups, whether government or nongovernment, national or international, 
already have Yolanda-related assessments. There needs to be a sharing of these 
                                                     
57 Multiple Authors (2014) Agam: Filipino Narratives on Uncertainty and Climate Change, Manila: The 
Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities; ‘Yolanda Art Exhibition on Display in London’ (2015) The Manila 
Standard Today. Available at: http://manilastandardtoday.com/news/-main-stories/189307/yolanda-art-
collection-on-display-in-london.html. Accessed 8 February 2016.  
58 See: Klein. Naomi (2008) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, London: Penguin.   
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assessments. The current project can help in facilitating this process of sharing and 
consolidating assessments. 
2. An integrated information management system is needed? 
3. There is a need to discuss the pros and cons of the proposed tidal wall. 
4. The culture of donors needs to change from short-term to longer term solutions. 
5.  Local voices need to heard in disaster prevention and poverty alleviation; power 
dynamics need to change at different levels. 
6. Resilience needs to be related to rights using the rights-based approach. 
7. Local resilience, whilst being a good thing, can also be seen as a failure on the part of 
the ‘duty’ bearers, i.e. government. 
8. Multilevel governance is obviously required in these situations and stakeholders must 
work together despite differences to provide sustainable solutions to poverty and risks 
related to natural disasters. 
9. While it is easier to hold governments and politicians accountable and blame them for 
failures, accountability should be across different sectors. 
10. A holistic approach instead of piecemeal approach should be the goal in interventions 
and solutions. 
11. Formal versus informal networks must be taken into account in any DRRM plan. 
12. For all stakeholders, there needs to be a shift from proactive to reactive disaster 
response. 
 
In terms of research and education, the workshop was able to identify a number of roles or 
responsibilities of academics and experts. They are as follows: 
- Documenting and synthesizing lessons and assessments learned from Yolanda 
other cases as basis for planning; 
- Information dissemination and capacity-building of communities; 
- Documentation of local knowledge, including not just narratives of survival and 
terminologies, but cultural manifestations of people’s experiences through poems, 
photographs, paintings, etc. and how these are used for individual and community 
healing and understanding of events; 
- Addressing non-physical damages like psychosocial trauma; 
- Developing manuals using people’s own terminologies and harmonizing them 
with those developed by other academics, international agencies, and CSOs; and 
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- Improvement of available database. 
 
The above responsibilities should be approached as a multidisciplinary effort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
